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DOOR S UT AND EARS PLU
ED: OW
CONSUMER REPORTIN CASTS IDENTITY
T EFT ICTIMS OUT OF FINANCIAL
SOCIETY AND OW T E LAW CAN E
ARMONI ED TO RIN T EM ACK
A STRACT
Consumer Reporting Agencies (CRAs) are the gatekeepers to the
American economy. As the chief informants for prospective lenders,
landlords, and employers, they exert immense power over the day-to-day
decisions of who gets what. Despite these high stakes, the CRAs run
consumer reporting as an automated electronic process that causes a lot of
reporting errors, disqualifying consumers from essential goods, services,
and opportunities. This is painfully true in the context of identity theft,
where perverse incentives pollute the integrity of consumer reporting,
piling undue harm onto identity theft victims. The law provides a remedy for
this problem, but circuit courts are split on whether to allow it for identity
theft victims, adopting different approaches. This Note proposes a solution
that seeks to harmonize the caselaw in the Third and Seventh Circuits with
a fair and practical rule. In doing so, it will dismiss a rule from the First
and Ninth Circuits.
INTRODUCTION
We begin our inquiry into the problem of identity theft in consumer
reports with a tale of international financial fraud and its fallout in
consumer reporting. In August 2013, a man named Marlen Manukyan
opened several bank accounts around Miami, Florida for himself and his
online car sales business.1 Shortly thereafter, he made his first sale, when a
couple in Texas paid him $39,960 for an RV listed on his craigslist page.2
The couple wired the payment from their bank in Sugarland, Texas to a
purported third-party escrow agent in Florida, believing the escrow agent
would protect their money until they received the RV.3 However, there was
no RV, and the escrow agent was nothing more than a shell company
created by Marlen under a stolen identity. 4 The entire transaction was a
fabrication.
1. Indictment at 3–5, U.S. v. Manukyan, No. 16-cr-20263 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
2. Indictment at 5, U.S. v. Manukyan, No. 16-cr-20263 (S.D. Fla. 2016). See also Drew
Armstrong, I Lost my Identity to a Fraudster, and It Took Six Years to Clean up the Mess,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201908-12/i-lost-my-identity-to-a-fraudster-and-it-took-six-years-to-clean-up-the-mess.
3. Indictment at 5, U.S. v. Manukyan, No. 16-cr-20263 (S.D. Fla. 2016). See also Armstrong,
supra note 2.
4. See Indictment at 3-5, U.S. v. Manukyan, No. 16-cr-20263 (S.D. Fla. 2016). See also
Armstrong, supra note 2.

156

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 15

Upon receiving the Texas couples’ payment, Marlen wired it from a
fake business account at Wells Fargo Bank to an overseas account at AlphaBank in Moscow, Russia. 5 Local police were on Marlen’s trail with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation not far behind. 6 Eventually, Marlen was
indicted and sent to prison on a plea deal, serving two years for money
laundering before being deported back to Russia: a decisive resolution to a
complex crime. 7 Things were far messier for the individuals whose
identities he stole to set up the fraudulent enterprise, however.8
One of those identity theft victims was Andrew Armstrong. 9 Using
Andrew’s identity, Marlen registered his fake business, “ZRF International
Services LLC,” with the Florida Secretary of State, 10 and set up bank
accounts in Andrew’s name at TD Bank, Bank of America, Popular Bank,
and Wells Fargo.11 Everything Marlen did using Andrew’s identity showed
up on Andrew’s credit reports,12 destroying Andrew’s credit and, casting
him out of financial society.13 It was impossible for him to get a new credit
card or apply for a mortgage, 14 and for several years, whenever he traveled
internationally, he was stopped by security agents for extra screening.15 His
attempts to fix his credit reports were a seemingly endless waste of time, as
he was pushed through a “byzantine maze of customer service
representatives.”16 As Andrew described, “After I explained my story over
the phone to a woman at Bank of America Corp., she thanked me for being
a customer, which I’d never been.” 17 He fruitlessly mailed packets of
evidence—including copies of his passport, driver’s license, and utility
bills—to prove the transactions were not his.18 Finally, six years after his
identity was stolen and two years after Marlen pleaded guilty, Andrew’s
credit reports were corrected. 19 His takeaway from the six-year long
debacle:

5.
6.
7.
8.

Indictment at 5–6, U.S. v. Manukyan, No. 16-cr-20263 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
Armstrong, supra note 2.
Id.
Indictment at 4–5, U.S. v. Manukyan, No. 16-cr-20263 (S.D. Fla. 2016). See also
Armstrong, supra note 2.
9. Armstrong, supra note 2.
10. Fla. Sec. Of State, Electronic Articles of Organization for Florida Limited Liability
Company, ZRF International Services LLC (Aug. 7, 2013) (filed under the name Andrew
Armstrong).
11. Indictment at 4–5, U.S. v. Manukyan, No. 16-cr-20263 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
12. Armstrong, supra note 2.
13. Id. (“Identity theft isn’t just an inconvenience; it shut me out of the most basic parts of the
consumer-financial system.”).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Our financial identity is a spool of fishing line left carelessly in a drawer.
You pull it back out one day, and it’s become knotted into a mess. You
can try to untangle the line, but you can’t just cut or throw it away. Our
system ties you to the mess forever.20

If consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) were doing a better job, the
fraudulent transactions would have been corrected sooner and much of the
harm avoided.21
CRAs are the gatekeepers to the U.S. financial system.22 Lenders use
the CRAs’ consumer reports to decide whether to lend and, if so, at what
interest rates.23 Landlords use them to screen tenants.24 Employers use them
to inform hiring decisions.25 And yet, despite their powerful influence over
the decisions of who gets what, the consumer reports for forty-two million
Americans are riddled with errors.26 Many of the errors are inconsequential,
but for ten million of these consumers, they “can be life altering.”27 The
harm that follows represents a failure in both law and in economics,28 for
those who look to the latter for guidance on the reasonability of parties’
conduct.
While the law provides a solution under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) for this situation, some courts have blocked it and instead require
identity theft victims to prove that their consumer reports are inaccurate
before holding CRAs to account for the inaccuracies. 29 Those courts
misread the statute.30 The FCRA is clear that CRAs, as the producers of
consumer reports—and not consumers, as the involuntary subjects of
20. Id.
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (requiring consumer reporting agencies to report consumer
information at its “maximum possible accuracy”).
22. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44125, CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTING, CREDIT BUREAUS,
CREDIT SCORING, AND RELATED POLICY ISSUES 2 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/R44125.pdf; See also CHI CHI WU, ET. AL, AUTOMATED INJUSTICE REDUX: TEN YEARS
AFTER A KEY REPORT, CONSUMERS ARE STILL FRUSTRATED TRYING TO FIX CREDIT REPORTING
ERRORS 4 (2019).
23. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 4; David D. Schein & James D. Phillips, Holding Credit
Ratings Agencies Accountable: How the Financial Crisis May Be Contributing to Improving
Accuracy in Credit Reporting, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 329, 329 (2012).
24. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 4.
25. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 4; CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 22, at 1.
26. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 4 (citing Consumer Response Annual Report January 1–
December 31, 2017, CONSUMER FIN. PRO. BUREAU 13 (Mar. 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-response-annual-report_2017.pdf).
27. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 4 (citing Consumer Response Annual Report January 1–
December 31, 2017, CONSUMER FIN. PRO. BUREAU 13 (Mar. 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-response-annual-report_2017.pdf).
28. See Part II (Section D) (explaining how the consumer reporting system leads to inaccurate
consumer reports in the context of identity theft).
29. See Part III (explaining how the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and some lower courts,
misread the FCRA by requiring consumers to prove consumer report inaccuracies before requiring
CRAs to fix consumer reports).
30. See Part III.
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them—must bear the costs of accurate consumer reporting. 31 In other
words, under the FCRA, the burden of proof as to the accuracy of consumer
reports lies with the CRA. Thus, this Note will argue that courts should read
the FCRA to leave the costs of accurate consumer reporting with CRAs
when a consumer alerts the CRA to the fact that his identity was stolen.
Part I will explain how credit reporting works and how it fails to detect
identity theft. Part II will describe the FCRA and how it can encourage
CRAs to fix credit reporting errors arising from identity theft. It will also
show that the common law fails to provide an adequate remedy for
consumers when a CRA negligently reports erroneous consumer
information. Part III will set out the caselaw on CRAs’ statutory duties to
investigate and correct errors on credit reports. It will also focus on a split
in holdings between the Third and Seventh Circuits. A bewildering pleading
standard borrowed from the First and Ninth Circuits (by the lower court in
the Seventh Circuit) will also be discussed, and then dismissed as offensive
to the law as it is written and to financial justice as a practical matter. Part
IV will explain how the statute should be read. Then, it will propose a
solution that could serve to harmonize the Seventh Circuit’s apparent
concerns with the better rule in the Third Circuit.
I

ACK ROUND
A

OW CREDIT REPORTIN

WORKS

Credit reports, and consumer reports more generally, 32 are populated
based on computerized communications between the CRAs and the
furnishers of consumer information, usually lenders, debt collectors,
insurers, or landlords. 33 The CRAs, most prominently “the big three”—
Experian, TransUnion, and Equifax—then publish that information in
consumer reports. 34 Furnishers report information such as payment
histories, delinquencies, and defaults to the CRAs who compile the
information into consumer reports through an automated computer
process.35 Then, the CRAs sell the reports to the furnishers and potential
lenders, employers, landlords or other parties who use them to screen

31. See infra notes 195–196 and accompanying text (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681i).
32. Credit reports are one type of consumer report; other types of consumer reports are used
for tenant screening and employee background checks, for example. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra
note 22, at 3.
33. Michael Epshteyn, The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003: Will
Preemption of State Credit Reporting Laws Harm Consumers, 93 GEO. L.J. 1143, 1147 (2005).
34. Consumer Response Annual Report January 1–December 31, 2017, CONSUMER FIN. PRO.
BUREAU 13 (Mar. 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_
consumer-response-annual-report_2017.pdf.
35. About Us, E-OSCAR, https://www.e-oscar.org/implementation/about-us. (last visited Oct.
27, 2019).
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consumers for some sort of transaction. 36 The information is reported in
separate “tradelines” with each tradeline representing the transactions for
consumer accounts related to credit cards, lease agreements, or loans, for
example. 37 If the consumer report does not include damaging tradelines
(e.g. those reporting defaults and delinquencies) then the party using the
report to screen the consumer will tend to welcome him or her into a
transaction such as a loan, an employment agreement, or a residential
lease.38
While the furnishers must provide information and pay membership
fees to the CRAs 39 , they receive some benefits for contributing to the
consumer reporting system. 40 Namely, a furnisher can protect its own
position as creditor by furnishing the consumer’s debt to CRAs for
publication as tradelines in consumer reports, thus discouraging third-party
creditors from overwhelming a consumer with too much debt.41 In turn, the
CRA receives the benefit of a more comprehensive product with more
tradelines to sell to furnishers and other customers who rely on the
consumer reports.42
Consumers, however, are often harmed by consumer reporting.43 The
problem is that the industry standard reporting process necessarily creates a
lot of errors. 44 Those errors tend to result from one or more of the
following: (1) “mixed files” (when the CRA’s automated reporting logic
mixes up consumer histories),45 (2) furnishers sending bad information to
CRAs,46 (3) glitches in a CRA’s automated reporting process that cause the
erroneous tradeline to re-appear despite the CRA having deleted it,47 and (4)
36. Chi Chi Wu, Automated Injustice: How A Mechanized Dispute System Frustrates
Consumers Seeking to Fix Errors in Their Credit Reports, 14 N.C. Banking Inst. 139, 180 (2010)
(explaining that CRAs make most of their money from furnishers).
37. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 22, at 4.
38. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 22, at 3.
39. Experian Membership Application, EXPERIAN, https://www.experian.com/content/dam
/marketing/na/assets/im/consumer-information/general/Reporting-Data-ContractualDocuments.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2020).
40. Credit Data Reporting Services, EXPERIAN, https://www.experian.com/consumerinformation/reporting-to-credit-agencies (last visited Sept. 6, 2020).
41. Id.
42. Data Reporting, TRANSUNION, https://www.transunion.com/data-reporting/data-reporting
(last visited Sept. 6, 2020).
43. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text (explaining how inaccurate consumer
reports can result in loss of access to credit, housing, and employment).
44. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 22, at 9 (describing matching errors and errors due to
fraud); Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 5–6 (Feb. 2019); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, KEY
DIMENSIONS AND PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEM (2012), https://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_credit-reporting-white-paper.pdf.
45. Mixed files can happen due to automated matching of similar names, social security
numbers, and other identifiers. Wu, supra note 36, at 146.
46. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 44, at 25. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 5–6.
47. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 44, at 24;
Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 5–6.
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fraud, like identity theft.48 This Note focuses on problems inherent in the
correction of errors resulting from identity theft.
Unlike the other common types of consumer reporting inaccuracies,
errors resulting from identity theft can hardly be corrected without a
furnisher acting against its own interest or a CRA actually engaging in
some investigating as the FCRA requires. 49 For one, furnishers of credit
report information can collect from identity theft victims on a disputed
account and not want to admit that their records fail to prove they are
entitled to such payment. 50 Indeed, debt collectors can use consumer
reports to collect false debts.51 Where identity theft is alleged, CRAs should
know furnishers are conflicted sources of information but they defer to
them nonetheless. 52 On other occasions, the furnisher’s conflict of interest
is irrelevant, because the CRA omits the fact that a fraud has occurred in its
request for furnisher verification.53 Naturally, a furnisher cannot verify a
tradeline as accurate when it has not been alerted to the possibility of
identity theft. If a furnisher does not know the information in its records is
fraudulent, then it cannot know that its normal verification process—
matching its information on the consumer with what the CRA sends it—
will as a matter of fact fail, because an identity thief used that same
information to open the fraudulent account in question. 54
Here is how the process tends to work: a consumer sends a “dispute
letter” asking the CRA to delete one or more erroneous tradelines from the
consumer report, triggering a statutory duty for the CRA to either verify the
disputed tradeline as accurate, modify it to make it accurate, or delete it.55
48. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 44, at 24; Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 5–6.
49. To be clear, correcting the other types of credit report errors can be excruciatingly painful
for consumers even though those errors lack the inherent conflict of interest in identity theft cases.
See Wu, supra note 36, at 139 (describing how consumer Kenneth Baker’s credit history was
mixed with another consumer’s, resulting in delinquencies, charge-offs, collections, and
judgments appearing on his consumer reports, leading to Baker developing severe depression as
he tried unsuccessfully to take out a mortgage for his family, and finally leading to Baker’s
suicide).
50. See Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 19 (explaining that debt collectors have no incentive to
verify disputed accounts truthfully in light of the fact that they are primarily interested in being
paid on the disputed account).
51. See Wu, supra note 36, at 178 (“For debt collectors, the credit reporting system alleviates
them from the need to prove in a court of law by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ that a
consumer is liable for a debt, and that the amount of the debt is correct. Instead, the debt collector
simply places the black mark on the consumer’s credit report, and waits until the consumer needs
to buy a car or home or insurance coverage. The consumer is either forced to pay off the amount
to improve her credit report or forced to pay higher prices (if he or she can get the credit or
insurance at all).”).
52. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 6–7 (explaining that CRAs are “universally biased in favor of
furnishers and against consumers in disputes.”)
53. See Wu, supra note 36, at 177.
54. See infra notes 100-101 and accompanying text (describing the situation where a CRA
fails to put a furnisher on notice of a purported fraud).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(A).
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The CRAs look into potential errors on consumer reports by sending
consumer disputes to the relevant furnisher for verification, through a webbased computer system called e-OSCAR. 56 Only limited information is
communicated over the e-OSCAR system, so a furnisher does not
necessarily learn everything that the consumer tells the CRA in her dispute
letter. 57 Furnishers respond to the CRA’s verification request by crosschecking the customer’s information (e.g., name and social security
number) against the information in their records.58 Where an identity thief
has opened an account with a victim’s personal information, cross-checking
of the consumer’s personal information against the furnisher’s information
on the consumer verifies a tradeline as accurate despite the fact that it was
incurred fraudulently by an imposter.59 Upon verification by the furnisher,
the CRA continues to publish the disputed tradeline without examining any
documents, interviewing consumers, or exercising “any form of human
discretion in resolving the dispute.”60 A visual simplification of the process,
with examples of some furnishers and CRAs, follows immediately below.

56. E-OSCAR is the computer system where CRAs and Furnishers communicate with each
other to resolve disputed tradelines through the sending of Automated Dispute Verification Codes
(ACDVs). About Us, supra note 35.
57. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 6. However, there has been some progress on this front, as the
CFPB began to enforce the requirement that CRAs send all relevant information from a
consumer’s dispute to the furnisher. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 14.
58. Id. at 6.
59. Christopher E. Kittell, What You Need to Know About the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
MISS. LAWYER, Spring 2012, at 48.
60. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 6.
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The key takeaway is that the standard dispute resolution process for
fixing consumer reports can be completely useless in the identity theft
context.
Consider, for example, the story of Adrienne Escobar whose mother,
Julie Escobar, forged her signature on a student loan application.61 After
Julie defaulted on the loan, the default showed up as a tradeline on
Adrienne’s consumer reports. 62 Julie admitted to stealing Adrienne’s
identity in a letter to the lender, Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance
Agency Services (PHEAA), and she offered to cooperate to help PHEAA
fix the account in May 2008.63 But PHEAA continued to the report the loan
as belonging to Adrienne, so the CRAs continued to include it on
Adrienne’s consumer reports.64 In August 2015, with the lender-furnisher
ignoring Julie’s admission, Adrienne filed a police report and attached it to
dispute letters she sent to Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion. 65 In
accordance with the standard dispute resolution process, the CRAs
investigated Adrienne’s dispute by asking PHEAA whether or not Adrienne
owed the money, and PHEAA continued to say that Adrienne did.66 Finally,
eight years after Julie admitted to PHEAA that she forged Adrienne’s
signature, the CRAs stopped reporting the default on Adrienne’s consumer
reports. 67 Adrienne had to send four sets of dispute letters to the CRAs
before they finally fixed the consumer reports.68 The FCRA is clear: one
dispute letter should be enough.69
T E SCOPE OF IDENTITY T EFT AND OW CRAS MA NIFY ITS
ARM

Identity theft is widespread, with just under 445,000 identity theft
reports filed with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2018. 70
However, not all identity thefts are reported to the FTC, as 14.4 million
consumers are thought to have had their identities stolen that year.71 CRAs
are largely to blame for the pervasiveness of the problem and for amplifying
its harm when identities are stolen.72 The CRAs increase the prevalence of
61. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 18 (citing Escobar v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency
Serv.’s, No. 17-4212, 2018 WL 1740364 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11 2018).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(A).
70. Fed. Trade Comm’n, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK 6 (2018).
71. Overview of 2019 Identity Fraud Study: Fraudsters Seek New Targets and Victims Bear
the Brunt , (JAVELIN Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/coverage-area/2019-identityfraud-report-fraudsters-seek-new-targets-and-victims-bear-brunt.
72. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 18.
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identity theft by failing to protect private consumer information from
hackers, thus enabling criminals to use the stolen private information in
fraudulent transactions. 73 As for amplifying identity theft’s harm, CRAs
tend to report fraudulent tradelines in spite of evidence consumers produce
to show their identities were stolen. 74 As a result, victims have to spend
incalculable hours and thousands of dollars to correct their consumer
reports.75
Two of the big three CRAs, Experian and Equifax, have already failed
to protect consumers’ private information from hackers. First, in 2013, an
identity thief tricked an Experian subsidiary, US Info Search, into granting
him access to the personal information and financial data of more than 200
million consumers. 76 The identity thief in that case pleaded guilty to
running an identity theft service with the consumer information he stole
from the Experian subsidiary.77 Just two years later, Experian dropped the
ball again, as hackers stole fifteen million social security numbers of people
who applied for wireless phone financing with T-Mobile. 78 Notably,
Equifax failed to learn from Experian’s mistakes, exposing the personal
information of 147 million consumers during a May 2017 data breach.79 As
Equifax disclosed in September of that year, hackers stole the personal
information of 147 million consumers from its data systems.80 The stolen
personal information included: first and last names, home and other
physical addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth,
social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, military identification
card numbers, passport numbers, banking account numbers, credit card and
debit card information, and various usernames and passwords. 81 Months

73. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 2, 10, F.T.C. v.
Equifax Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03297-TWT (N.D. Ga. Jul. 23, 2019); MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R.
COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 115TH CONG., THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH
18 (Comm. Print 2018).
74. Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 18.
75. Christopher P. Couch, Forcing the Choice Between Commerce and Consumers:
Application of the FCRA to Identity Theft, 53 ALA. L. REV. 583, 583 (2002).
76. MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 115TH
CONG., THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 18 (Comm. Print 2018) (citing Brian Krebs, Experian
Breach Affects 15 Million Customers, KREBS ON SEC. (Oct. 15, 2015), https://krebsonsecurity.
com/2015/10/experian-breach-affects-15-million-consumers/.
77. Brian Krebs, Experian Breach Affects 15 Million Customers, KREBS ON SEC. (Oct. 3,
2020), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/10/experian-breach-affects-15-million-consumers/.
78. MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 115TH
CONG., THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 18 (Comm. Print 2018).
79. 2017 Cybersecurity Incident & Important Consumer Information, EQUIFAX,
https://www.equifaxsecurity2017.com/consumer-notice/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2020); Stipulated
Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 2, F.T.C. v. Equifax Inc., No. 1:19-cv03297-TWT (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2019).
80. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 2, F.T.C. v. Equifax
Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03297-TWT (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2019).
81. Id. at 10.
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before the breach, Equifax earned a data security rating of zero out of ten
from financial index provider MSCI Inc.82
Hacks like those lead to identity theft as thieves sell or use the stolen
information to open fraudulent lines of credit and make purchases in
victims’ names.83 Then, once the identity thief fails to make payments on
the fraudulently opened account, the counterparty to the account (e.g., a
lender or debt collector) reports it as a delinquent tradeline to CRAs who
then publish the information on the identity theft victim’s consumer
reports.84 Consumers’ lives are harmed when the tradeline shows up on preemployment screenings, background checks, and traditional credit reports.85
The causal chain concludes with consumers—who never volunteered to
take part in the consumer reporting industry—being denied a place to live, a
source of income, and affordable credit if they qualify to borrow at all.86
II STATUTORY ISTORY OF T E FCRA AND T E SETTLED
LAW ON ITS APPLICATION
A T E FCRA PROMOTES ACCURACY AND FAIRNESS IN CREDIT
REPORTIN T ROU A REMEDIAL APPROAC
Congress enacted the FCRA in 1970 to promote accuracy and fairness
in credit reporting with an emphasis on reasonable procedures for meeting
the needs of commerce in a way that is fair and equitable to consumers.87
The law was amended with the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of
1996 (the 1996 Amendments) amid widespread credit report inaccuracies.88
The 1996 Amendments emphasized a remedial approach, rather than a
preventative one, to solve the problem of inaccurate credit reporting89 by
creating the dispute resolution process that remains today. 90 Under the
remedial scheme, when a consumer disputes information on his or her
credit report with a CRA, the CRA has a duty to conduct a reasonable
“reinvestigation” 91 of the disputed information. 92 CRAs typically
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
See Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 18.
See Kittell, supra note 59, at 48; Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 12.
Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 18.
CRAs collect information from furnishers (e.g. lenders and debt collectors) without
authorization from consumers. While furnishers of information have a relationship with
individuals as customers, CRAs have no such relationship with the individuals on whom they sell
information. See id. at 4–5.
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)–(b) (2018).
88. Brendan Delany, Identity Theft: The Fair Credit Reporting Act and Negligent Enablement
of Imposter Fraud, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 553, 559 (2005).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 560.
91. Under the FCRA’s remedial scheme, the CRA is said to have conducted an “investigation”
when it automatically reports information that furnishers send it over the e-OSCAR system. Wu,
supra note 36, at 156–59. A “reinvestigation” is the process by which a CRA looks into the
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reinvestigate disputed information by sending Automated Consumer
Dispute Verification (ACDV) forms, over the e-OSCAR system, to the
party that furnished the information to the CRA. 93 The furnisher then
verifies the related tradelines as accurate—allowing the CRA to leave the
disputed tradelines on the consumer report—or inaccurate, in which case
the CRA must delete the disputed tradelines. 94 Like the CRA’s
reinvestigation, the furnisher’s investigation is governed by a reasonability
standard. 95 If the furnisher cannot verify the disputed tradelines, it must
inform the CRA requesting verification (along with all other CRAs to
whom it has reported the disputed information) that the tradelines might be
inaccurate.96
Courts hold that, under the FCRA, consumers have a private right of
action against both CRAs and furnishers where an investigation is
conducted unreasonably.97 The reasonability of a furnisher’s investigation
depends in part on what the furnisher learns about the dispute from the
relevant CRA.98 For example, where a CRA fails to inform the furnisher
that a consumer’s dispute arises from identity theft, the furnisher’s crosschecking of the consumer’s personal information (provided by the CRA)
against the information in its payment systems (provided by the identity
thief) should be deemed reasonable.99 In such a case, the CRA fails to put
the furnisher on notice that a normal cross-checking of consumer
information is not enough, thus leaving liability with the CRA, for

information automatically reported through e-OSCAR to determine whether the information is
indeed accurate. Id. at 142–43.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (As amended in 1996). Before 1996, § 1681i pertained to the
requirement that CRAs maintain reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy,
which is now codified in § 1681e(b). The provisions are separate causes of action and should not
be confused. In the case of identity theft, a plaintiff might, for example, argue that a CRA failed to
maintain reasonable procedures to not report fraudulent transactions in a consumer report, perhaps
by alleging the consumer’s file was mixed with that of the identity thief. Such an argument is a
discussion for another day. This note is focused on the reasonability of CRA reinvestigations
triggered by an identity theft victim’s dispute of inaccurate information published in his credit
report, against a CRA under the new § 1681i.
93. Wu, supra note 36, at 157; About Us, supra note 34.
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i, 1681s-2(b).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) (providing a private cause of action against furnishers who conduct
unreasonable investigations of the information that consumers dispute as inaccurate).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).
97. See Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2009);
DeAndrade v. Trans Union LLC, 523 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2008); Cushman v. Trans Union Corp.,
115 F.3d 220, 225–26 (3d Cir. 1997); Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 287 (7th Cir.
1994); Stevenson v. TRW Inc., 987 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1993); Carvalho v. Equifax Info.
Servs., Inc. 629 F.3d 876, 888 (9th Cir. 2010).
98. See Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1157.
99. “If a CRA fails to provide ‘all relevant information’ to a furnisher, then the consumer has a
private cause of action against the CRA[,] but not against the furnisher.” Chiang v. Verizon New
England Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 2010).
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unreasonable “reinvestigation”. 100 However, the CRA cannot simply punt
its reasonable reinvestigation duty to the furnisher by letting it know the
consumer disputes the information as resulting from identity theft. Rather,
where a CRA knows the furnisher might be an unreliable source of
information—like in the case of identity theft 101 —the CRA’s
reinvestigation into the disputed tradeline must do more than simply parrot
the conflicted furnisher.102
Notably, the 1996 Amendments did not include a discussion of how the
remedial scheme should work in the context of identity theft.103 That does
not however preclude courts from applying the reasonability requirement
from the 1996 Amendments’ to identity theft victims’ unreasonable
reinvestigation claims. 104 Indeed, it is inaccurate to report tradelines as
belonging to a consumer when they in fact belong to an identity thief, and a
CRA’s reinvestigation cannot be reasonable where all the CRA does is ask
the conflicted furnisher to verify the tradeline as accurate.
T E FCRA PRO IDES T E ONLY FEASI LE CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR REMEDYIN IDENTITY T EFT ON CREDIT REPORTS
Identity theft victims have limited recourse to remedy the harm caused
by the inclusion of fraudulent accounts on their credit report.105 Common
law negligence claims were defeated as courts held consumers lack the
special relationship with CRAs and furnishers necessary to impose a duty of
care in the handling of their credit report information.106 Courts have also
declined to recognize a property right for individuals’ private
information.107 Defamation claims against CRAs have seen mixed results as
a requisite showing of malice creates a high evidentiary hurdle for
consumer plaintiffs. 108
100. A CRA must provide “all relevant information regarding the dispute that the [CRA] has
received from the consumer.” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1157 (quoting 15 USC § 1681i(a)(2)(A)).
101. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text (describing how furnishers are incentivized
to wrongly verify false accounts in order to collect on a debt).
102. See Kittell, supra note 58, at 50.
103. Couch, supra note 75, at 592.
104. Id. at 597.
105. See Delany, supra note 88, at 569.
106. Id.
107. Erin Dowe, Frustration Station: Attempting to Control Your Credit 16 GEO. MASON U.
C.R. L. J. 359, 372–73 (2006).
108. Compare, e.g., Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 229 (3d Cir. 1997)
(remanding to lower court to determine whether plaintiff produced evidence sufficient for a
showing of malice) with Blackwell v. Chex Systems, Inc. 2020 WL 2615630 at *8 (E.D. Pa. May
22, 2020) (finding a defamation claim survived a motion to dismiss where the CRA continued to
publish inaccurate credit report information it knew was false). See also Thomas J. Goger,
Sufficiency of Showing of Malice or Lack of Reasonable Care to Support Credit Agency’s Liability
for Circulating Inaccurate Credit Report, 40 A.L.R. 3d 1049 (Originally published in 1971) (“It is
generally agreed that mere negligence on the part of the credit agency is not sufficient to
constitute malice and it has been held that the presence of malice may be rebutted by evidence that
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With only limited remedies under the common law for consumers
harmed by false credit report information, Congress created a statutory
cause of action with the FCRA.109 The FCRA provides for actual damages
and attorney fees in cases of negligent violations of its provisions, and
punitive damages for willful violations.110 However, the FCRA also limited
consumers’ recourse.111 Notably, the remedial scheme provided for by the
1996 Amendments preempted states from enacting more heightened
requirements for the credit reporting industry, 112 and the preemption
provisions were expanded even further with the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act (FACTA) in 2003. 113 Thus, the stakes are high for the
question of whether a CRA should be held to the FCRA’s reasonable
reinvestigation requirement in the identity theft context, as the dispute
resolution process and private rights of action against CRAs and furnishers
for investigating disputed information unreasonably represent the only
practical remedy.114
C CON RESSIONAL AMENDMENTS TO T E FCRA IN
S ORT OF FI IN T E PRO LEM

FALL

FACTA provided for fraud alerts, credit freezes, and reporting blocks to
alleviate identity theft’s impact on credit reports.115 But the provisions are
insufficient.116 The fraud alert provisions allow consumers to contact a CRA
which must then place a nationwide fraud alert on the consumer’s report.117
Credit freezes in turn allow consumers to halt all access to their credit
reports until the consumer lifts the freeze.118 Reporting blocks might have
solved the problem if not for a provision allowing CRAs to decline to block
the fraudulent information.119 Each of the actions are triggered only by the
the agency circulated a corrected report promptly upon learning of its error and by evidence that
when the report was made, the agency had reasonable grounds to rely upon the truth of the
information contained therein.”); Schein & Phillips, supra note 23, at 330 (“At common law,
credit bureaus had extremely limited responsibility for reporting errors, and when sued for
defamation, a bureau was able to raise the defense of conditional privilege.”)
109. Schein & Phillips, supra note 23, at 330–33.
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o.
111. Delany, supra note 88, at 562–63.
112. Id.
113. Schein & Phillips, supra note 23, at 336.
114. Gary M. Victo & Ian B. Lyngklip, Remedies for Identity Theft Victims: Strategies for
Protecting and Preserving Clients’ Rights, 85 MICH. B.J. 35, 36 (2006).
115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c-1, c-2.
116. See Dowe, supra note 108, at 382–84 (explaining that FACTA’s provisions establish a
nationwide fraud alert system but noting that “the damage to one’s credit history could already be
complete” by the time a consumer places a fraud alert); Couch, supra note 75, at 585 (explaining
how creditors and debt collectors continue collection efforts even after a consumer asserts an
account was fraudulently opened in his name).
117. FED. TRADE COMM’N, IDENTITY THEFT: A RECOVERY PLAN 25 (2018).
118. Id. at 5.
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681, c-2(c).
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consumer’s request. 120 Additionally, the law provides for consumers to
include statements, published alongside delinquent tradelines on their credit
report, disputing the tradelines as the result of identity theft.121 But lenders
can simply ignore, or disbelieve, consumer statements claiming that they
were the victims of identity theft and as a result the statements hardly
change lenders’ decisions on whether to extend credit and at what rates.122
Notably, Quicken, a personal finance company and affiliate of Quicken
Loans, explained in a post on its website that, “[e]xplanatory statements,
since they cannot change the facts of your credit report, may be viewed [by
prospective lenders, landlords, and employers] simply as excuses.”123
A cursory look through recent credit reporting complaints reported in
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) public consumer
complaint database further supports the necessity of using the 1996
Amendments’ remedial approach to encourage accurate credit reporting.
One consumer complained in April 2020, following an identity thief’s use
of credit cards, utilities, and an apartment lease in his name, that he placed
both a fraud alert and a security freeze on his accounts—the FACTA
solutions to the identity theft problem—only to be denied credit, a place to
live, and a job.124 In addition, the consumer asserted that the identity thief
gained the personal information to open the fraudulent accounts from
Equifax’s consumer data breach.125 Four consumers came forward in May
2020 with similar stories. The first and second of those complaints were
from consumers asserting that they were denied employment due to an
identity thief’s fraudulent charges being included on their credit reports. 126
Another consumer, after filing a police report describing identity theft,
complained that she could not get CRAs to remove fraudulent charges from
her account, yet again resulting in denial of a job despite a fraud alert she

120. Id.
121. See Dowe, supra note 108, at 384.
122. See Couch, supra note 75, at 585 (explaining how creditors and debt collectors continue
collection efforts even after a consumer asserts an account was fraudulently opened in her name).
123. This post was removed from Quicken’s website sometime between June 2008 and January
2009, according to Internet Archive, a non-profit collector of historical webpages. A screenshot of
the page can be found through Internet Archive’s “Wayback Machine.” Quicken, “Banking: When
Consumer Statements Can Help,” https://web.archive.org/web/20080629022705/http://www.
quicken.com:80/cms/viewers/article/banking/39623. (screenshot of webpage dated June 29, 2008;
accessed Oct. 26, 2019). The post was originally cited by Erin Dowe in a paper published in 2006.
Dowe, supra note 108, at 384 n.180.
124. Complaint ID 3597009, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Aug 20, 2020), https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/detail/3597009.
125. Id.
126. Complaint ID 3663672, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Aug 20, 2020), https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/detail/3663672; Complaint ID
3634662, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Aug 20, 2020), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/dataresearch/consumer-complaints/search/detail/3634662.
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had placed on her consumer report. 127 Finally, yet another consumer
complained that he filed an identity theft report with the FTC, a complaint
with the CFPB, and a dispute with TransUnion, all seeking to have
fraudulent charges removed from the consumer’s credit report to no avail.128
Thus, the examples provide yet more evidence of fraud alerts and credit
freezes failing to solve the problem of identity theft in consumer reports.
D CONFLICTS OF INTEREST UNDERMINE T E INTE RITY OF T E
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS IN CASES OF IDENTITY T EFT
Absent legal penalties, CRAs have little incentive to correct errors on
consumers’ credit reports in cases of identity theft or otherwise.129 In fact,
CRAs might have good reason to ignore errors. 130 During a 2000 FTC
identity theft workshop, a representative of a CRA trade group said CRAs
had new products in the works with the capacity to conduct more diligent
vetting of consumer information. 131 The same theme—CRAs developing
business lines that profit from the risk of identity theft rather than correcting
for it as part of their obligation to report accurately—is apparent in credit
monitoring services offered by the three largest CRAs. 132 Indeed, as
TransUnion explained in its annual disclosure, increased identity theft from
data breaches drove consumer subscriptions to credit monitoring and
identity protection services up by approximately 20% between 2015 and
2018. 133 Notably, the FCRA requires that CRAs maintain procedures to
ensure “maximum possible accuracy.”134 In spite of that requirement, CRAs
can profit from the pervasiveness of identity theft by selling credit

127. Complaint ID 3649172, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Aug 20, 2020), https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/detail/3649172.
128. Complaint ID 3655467, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Aug 20, 2020), https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/detail/3655467.
129. Jeff Sovern, The Jewel of Their Souls: Preventing Identity Theft Through Loss Allocation
Rules, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 343, 362 (2003).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 363 n.70.
132. See Delany, supra note 88, at 556 n. 16.
133. TransUnion, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 14, 2019) (Describing growing
consumer subscriptions to credit monitoring services as a driver of growth for the company’s
consumer facing business, driven by increased identity theft risks and increased availability of free
credit report information). TransUnion’s annual report does not break out revenues for its
consumer division specifically, but Equifax’s and Experian’s do. Equifax’s Global Consumer
Solutions business, which houses its credit monitoring services, reported $371.8 million in
revenue in 2018 despite “being negatively impacted by the 2017 cybersecurity incident.” Equifax
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 38 (Feb. 21, 2019). Experian’s consumer division in turn
reported $985 million in revenue in 2018. Experian PLC, Experian Annual Report: Year Ended
Mar. 31, 2019, at 3 (Experian is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, so its annual disclosure was not
made via Form 10-K).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
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monitoring services rather than simply sniffing out identity theft as part of
the consumer reporting process.135
The interests of furnishers can also be in conflict with those of
consumers. 136 Furnishers have a strong incentive to verify inaccurate
information as accurate where the account disputed is fraudulently opened
by an identity thief in the consumer’s name.137 Lenders and debt collectors,
for example, cannot collect debts from consumers if they declare the debt
actually belongs to an unknown imposter. 138 This helps explain why the
standard dispute resolution process employed by CRAs cannot work where
the alleged inaccuracy pertains to identity theft absent the private causes of
action adopted by the 1996 Amendments’ remedial scheme. 139 Creditors
lacking supporting evidence of the disputed tradelines would not want to
admit the inadequacy of their records for fear of having to prove the debt in
an action to collect.
III CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT ON T E TEST FOR UNREASONA LE
REIN ESTI ATION CLAIMS IN T E IDENTIY T EFT
CONTE T
Courts have developed two approaches for deciding the validity of
claims against CRAs where a consumer alleges the CRA, using the standard
dispute resolution process, failed to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of
identity theft tradelines. The first, developed by the Third Circuit in
Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., holds that reasonability of reinvestigation
is a question of fact for the jury to resolve based on a balancing of CRA
burden against consumer harm. 140 This approach leaves the cost of
reinvestigation where it belongs, with the CRA in accordance with its
statutory duty to verify the accuracy of disputed credit report information.141
The second, developed by the Seventh Circuit in Brill v. Trans Union,
requires identity theft victims to prove their innocence by a preponderance
of the evidence as to the identity theft tradelines in order to overcome a

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See Delany, supra note 88, at 556 n. 16.
Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 18–19.
Id. at 6.
See id.
Id. at 18–19.
See Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225–26 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Henson
v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 287 (7th Cir. 1994). Cf. Stevenson v. TRW Inc., 987 F.2d 288,
293 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding—three years prior to codification of the unreasonable investigation
cause of action against CRAs and furnishers in §§ 1681i and §1681s—that a CRA negligently
violated the FCRA by taking an unreasonably long time to investigate information disputed as
resulting from identity theft, noting that “[t]he [FCRA] places the burden of investigation
squarely on [the CRA].”).
141. Infra notes 195–196 and accompanying text (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681i).
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motion for summary judgment by a defendant CRA. That approach shifts
the cost of reinvestigation from the CRA to the consumer.142
Additionally, some lower courts have held that identity theft victims’
unreasonable reinvestigation claims must fail as a matter of law regardless
of what evidence consumers offer CRAs as to their identities, thus
dismissing claims at the pleading stage.143 Under this standard, a consumer
bears the heavy burden of investigating the identity theft and litigating to a
judgment that the consumer is not responsible for the debt.
The muddled caselaw appears to represent a tension over wanting to
hold CRAs to account for including erroneous and harmful tradelines on
consumer reports without opening the courts up to a flood of frivolous
consumer claims. The solution that will follow is to require that CRAs
engage in actual investigations—not just parroting conflicted furnishers—
but with consumers having to make good faith efforts to assist the CRA.
A T E T IRD CIRCUIT S TEST: LEA IN IT TO T E URY
The Third Circuit was the first federal appellate court to weigh in on the
question of whether a CRA should have to do more than just parrot a
conflicted furnisher as part of its reinvestigation into disputed tradelines
related to identity theft. As the court explained in Cushman v. Trans Union
Corp., the plain language of the FCRA requires CRAs to bear the burden of
reinvestigating disputed credit report information.144 The court wrote, “[A]
‘reinvestigation’ that merely shifts the burden back to the consumer and the
credit grantor cannot fulfill the obligations contemplated by the statute.”145
The court applied two factors described by the Seventh Circuit in Henson v.
CSC Credit Services to inquire into the reasonability of the CRA’s
reinvestigation.146 The first factor is “whether the consumer has alerted the
reporting agency to the possibility that the source [i.e. the furnisher] may be
unreliable or the reporting agency itself knows or should know that the

142. See Brill v. TransUnion LLC, 838 F.3d 919, 920–22 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding a CRA’s
reinvestigation reasonable as a matter of law where the CRA did no more than verify disputed
information with its furnisher in response to a consumer asserting identity theft because a
consumer failed to submit evidence proving their identity was stolen).
143. See, e.g., Brill v. Trans Union LLC, No. 15-CV-300-SLC, 2015 WL 9095103, at *3–4
(W.D. Wis. Dec. 16, 2015) (holding a consumer plaintiff’s unreasonable reinvestigation claim a
collateral attack on the legal validity of a debt, thus dismissing the consumer’s claim, before the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the consumer’s claim on different grounds)
144. Cushman, 115 F.3d at 225 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 293 (5th Cir.
1993)). See also 15 U.S.C. §1681i.
145. Cushman, 115 F.3d at 225 (3d Cir. 1997).
146. Cushman, 115 F.3d at 224–25 (3d Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit in Brill cited Henson
but declined to apply the Henson test to the facts before it, instead ruling that the CRA’s
reinvestigation in that case was reasonable as a matter of law. Brill, 838 F.3d at 921 (citing
Henson, v. CSC Credit Services, 29 F.3d 280, 287 (7th Cir. 1994)). The two factors that the Third
Circuit considers are only a couple of “a number of factors,” indicating other factors could be
considered even though they have not been so far. Cushman, 115 F.3d at 225 (3d Cir. 1997).
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source is unreliable.” 147 The second factor is “the cost of verifying the
accuracy of the source versus the possible harm inaccurately reported
information may cause the consumer.”148 The court explained, “Whatever
considerations exist, it is for ‘the trier of fact [to] weigh the[se] factors in
deciding whether [the CRA] violated the provisions of section 1681i.’”149
Applying the Henson factors, the Cushman court held the CRA in that
case was not entitled to summary judgment where the consumer alleged it
conducted an unreasonable reinvestigation by verifying disputed tradelines
only with furnishers.150 The consumer’s dispute in Cushman related to an
identity thief’s fraudulent credit card charges, and the furnishers in the case
were the credit card lenders. 151 Notably, the CRA’s reinvestigation in
Cushman was conducted by an employee who was paid an hourly wage of
$7.50 with an expectation of conducting ten investigations per hour. 152
While investigating the dispute, the employee did not request pertinent
documents from the furnishers or take any step beyond merely calling the
credit card providers to ask whether the accounts were accurate.153 Further,
the CRA’s employee did not disclose to the furnishers that the accounts
were disputed as fraudulent.154 Thus, the court found that a reasonable jury
could find the CRA violated its statutory duty to conduct a reasonable
reinvestigation of the disputed accounts.155 As the court explained:
The jury could have concluded that after [the CRA] was alerted to the
accusation that the accounts were obtained fraudulently, and then
confronted with the credit grantors’ reiteration of the inaccurate
information, [the CRA] should have known that the credit grantors were
‘unreliable’ to the extent that they had not been informed of the fraud. . . .
Similarly, the jury could have concluded that seventy-five cents per
investigation was too little to spend when weighed against Cushman’s
damages. 156
The Cushman approach has tended to result in rulings for consumers in
unreasonable reinvestigation claims against CRAs. 157 For example, in

147.
148.
149.
150.

Cushman, 115 F.3d at 225 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Henson, 29 F.3d at 287 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Id. at 225 (quoting Henson, 29 F.3d at 287 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Id. at 225–26 (quoting Henson, 29 F.3d at 287 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Id. at 226. The court’s opinion noted that the trial court ruled against the CRA’s motion for
summary judgment but later granted summary judgment for the CRA sua sponte, after
presentation of Cushman’s case at trial. Id. at 222–23.
151. Id. at 226.
152. Id. at 222. The CRA’s investigation here, conducted by an employee, differs from the
industry standard dispute resolution process in which CRAs send ACDVs to furnishers with a
codified description of the dispute. See Kittell, supra note 59, at 48; About Us, supra note 35.
153. Cushman, 115 F.3d at 222 (3d Cir. 1997).
154. Id. at 226.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 226.
157. See, e.g. Blackwell v. Chex Sys., Inc., No. 19-3419, 2020 WL 2615630 at *6-8 (E.D. Pa.
May 22, 2020).
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Blackwell v. Chex Systems, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania held that “parroting information it received from the
furnisher is not enough to fulfill [a CRA’s] obligation” to conduct a
reasonable reinvestigation where a consumer’s dispute relates to identity
theft, because in such a case a consumer has “alerted [the CRA] that the
source of information from furnishers may be unreliable.”158 The court cited
Cushman, rephrasing the rule as a three-factor test:
Whether the credit reporting agency must go beyond the original source
depends on a number of factors, including: (1) whether the consumer has
alerted the consumer reporting agency that the original source may be
unreliable; (2) whether the consumer reporting agency itself knows or
should know that the original source is unreliable; and (3) the comparative
costs of verifying the accuracy of the original sources versus the potential
harm the inaccurate information may cause the consumer.159

T E SE ENT CIRCUIT S TEST: T E CONSUMER S OULD EAR
T E COST OF IN ESTI ATIN
The Seventh Circuit held in Brill v. Trans Union that a CRA’s
reinvestigation was reasonable as a matter of law where the CRA continued
to report a tradeline disputed as resulting from identity theft following a
reinvestigation in which the CRA did no more than verify the account’s
accuracy with the furnisher. 160 Notably, the furnisher in that case was a
conflicted source of information given it was attempting to collect on the
account.161 To reach its decision, the court emphasized that Brill failed to
submit evidence proving he was the victim of identity theft.162 As for the
CRA’s statutory obligation to reasonably reinvestigate the disputed
tradeline, the court found no investigatory duty for the CRA beyond the
standard dispute resolution process. 163 First, the court found it unduly
burdensome for a CRA to hire a handwriting expert to compare Brill’s
signature with the signature used for the disputed account.164 As the court
explained:
Forcing a credit reporting agency to hire a handwriting expert in every
case of alleged forgery would impose an expense disproportionate to the
likelihood of an accurate resolution of the dispute over whether it was
158. Id. at *8.
159. Id. at *5 (citing Dixon-Rollins v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d 452, 458 (E.D.
Pa. 2010) (in turn citing Cushman, v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 1997)). In
addition, the court noted that “[t]he grave responsibility imposed under § 1681i(a) must consist of
something more than merely parroting information received from other sources.” Id. (citing
Schweitzer v. Equifax Info. Sols. LLC, 441 F. App’x 896, 904 (3d Cir. 2011).
160. Brill v. TransUnion LLC, 838 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2016).
161. See id. at 921.
162. Brill, 838 F.3d at 921 (7th Cir. 2016).
163. Id. at 921–922.
164. Id. at 920.
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indeed forgery. And so the FCRA’s provisions for identity theft, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681c–1, c–2, sensibly ask persons who believe they are or may be
victims of credit fraud to report to the police before turning to the credit
reporting agency. As far as we know, Brill didn’t do that.”165

Second, the court rejected the consumer’s suggestion that the CRA
analyze the handwriting itself, finding such an approach “undeveloped and
unsupported.” 166 Third, the court rejected the consumer’s suggestion that
the CRA evaluate the furnisher’s procedures for verifying customers’
identities, finding the consumer was in a better position to evaluate the
furnisher’s procedures than the CRA. 167 Finally, the court wrote of a
suggestion that the CRA interview employees of the furnisher that it “might
well be unduly burdensome for [the CRA] to ask [the furnisher] to identify,
and put [the CRA] in touch with, the employees.” 168 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit seems to treat the costs of investigating identity theft as part of a
consumer’s burden of proof as the plaintiff in unreasonable reinvestigation
cases against CRAs.169 As a result, the Seventh Circuit moves the cost of
reasonably reinvestigating disputed tradelines from CRAs to identity theft
victims themselves.
The Seventh Circuit’s finding in Brill that additional investigative steps
by the CRA would be unduly burdensome was guided by the fact that the
consumer in that case already settled a claim over the same account with its
furnisher.170 As the court explained, Brill was in a better position than the
CRA to investigate the disputed information because he had the opportunity
to collect information from the furnisher as to its verification processes
during the discovery stage of his case against the furnisher.171 The court
wrote, “It was his decision to settle his suit against Toyota rather than use
discovery procedures to explore the issue of forgery in depth.”172 Of course,
such a finding overlooks the FCRA’s statutory requirement that the burden
of conducting a reasonable reinvestigation falls only on the CRA.173

165. Id. at 921. The FCRA provisions that the court cites are the ones that FACTA added to the
law. As explained, they hardly solve the problem. Part II (Section C).
166. Id. at 922.
167. Id. (noting that the plaintiff could have deposed the furnisher’s employees during its suit
against the furnisher).
168. Id.
169. See id. at 921 ( “As the plaintiff he has the burden of proof, but rather than bear that
burden he invokes the statutory duty of reinvestigation by the credit reporting agency to shift the
burden of proof to TransUnion, insisting that TransUnion should have done more than check with
[the furnisher] Toyota…”).
170. Id. at 920–22.
171. Id. at 922.
172. Id.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i. See also Couch, supra note 75, at 597 (explaining that, while the FCRA
was not designed specifically for identity theft victims, the statute was intended to leave the costs
of accurate credit reporting with CRAs where CRAs are best positioned to reduce the risk of
inaccurate credit reporting).
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C T E EWILDERIN FACTUAL OR LE AL UESTION TEST
In order for a consumer to make out a viable unreasonable
reinvestigation claim against a CRA, some courts require that the consumer
show “factual inaccuracy” of the disputed tradelines. 174 If the disputed
tradeline is not factually inaccurate but rather relates to a legal question, the
consumer’s unreasonable reinvestigation claim is defeated without any
inquiry into CRA burden or consumer harm.175 In the identity theft context,
this pleading requirement for plaintiffs can lead to a CRA winning on a
motion to dismiss despite a reinvestigation that does nothing more than
parrot a conflicted furnisher. 176 CRAs have argued that an identity theft
victim cannot make out an unreasonable reinvestigation claim without a
court order declaring the disputed debts as unenforceable against the
consumer. 177 They contend this is necessary because CRAs would
otherwise have to act like courts of law to investigate identity theft.178 Thus,
the CRAs argue, identity theft victims’ unreasonable reinvestigation claims
fail to show factual inaccuracy but instead raise impermissible “collateral
attack[s] on the legal validity of consumer debts.”179 For courts deferring to
this CRA argument, identity is not a matter of fact but only a question of
law.180
The factual-or-legal-question test makes little sense in the identity theft
context. A consumer report is not a judgment, and it cannot discharge a
consumer of a debt or otherwise free him from an obligation described in a
tradeline. Perhaps the test is motivated by a concern that a consumer could
lie about identity theft to have tradelines that they did indeed incur removed
from their consumer reports. Of course, if that is the concern, the creditor
would still have the right to bring a debt collection action against the
consumer. Obviously, if a consumer sought to offer his consumer reports—
now excluding the creditor’s tradelines that the CRA could not verify—as
evidence to defend such a debt collection action, the creditor could respond
with the fact that roughly a quarter of credit reports contain “potentially
174. See, e.g., Brill v. Trans Union LLC, No. 15-CV-300-SLC, 2015 WL 9095103, at *3–4
(W.D. Wis. Dec. 16, 2015) (holding a consumer plaintiff’s unreasonable reinvestigation claim a
collateral attack on the legal validity of a debt, thus dismissing the consumer’s claim, before the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the consumer’s claim on different grounds) (citing
Carvalho v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 89091 (9th Cir. 2010) and
DeAndrade v. Trans Union LLC, 523 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2008).
175. See, e.g., Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 891-92 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Because CRAs are ill equipped to
adjudicate contract disputes, courts have been loath to allow consumers to mount collateral attacks
on the legal validity of their debts in the guise of FCRA reinvestigation claims”) (citing
DeAndrade, 523 F.3d at 68 (1st Cir. 2008)).
176. See, e.g., Brill v. Trans Union LLC, 2015 WL 9095103 at *5..
177. See, e.g., id. at 3.
178. See, e.g., id.
179. See, e.g., id.
180. See, e.g., id. at 4 (holding the disputed consumer report accurate as a matter of law because
only a court of law or a furnisher could cancel the consumer’s debt).
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material” errors. 181 Once the creditor earned a judgment, the tradeline
would reappear on the consumer report.
The bewildering factual-or-legal-question test was rightly abandoned on
appeal by the Seventh Circuit in Brill v. Trans Union, 182 albeit for the
troubling put-the-burden-on-the-consumer test, and perhaps only due to the
fact that the consumer had since settled a lawsuit against the furnisher over
the fraudulent debt.183 As the lower court in Brill unnecessarily lamented:
It’s not that the court lacks sympathy or empathy for Brill’s situation, but
the avenues of relief available to Brill do not include an FCRA claim
against Trans Union. The FCRA does not provide a basis to hold Trans
Union liable for continuing to report [the furnisher’s] determinations
regarding Brill and the lease extension. The FCRA’s reasonable
reinvestigation requirement does not impose a legal duty on Trans Union
to consider Brill’s handwriting evidence and make its own determination
that [the furnisher’s] report was inaccurate.184

On the contrary, the court could have ordered the CRA to delete the
identity theft tradeline from Brill’s credit report.185 A CRA does not have to
act like a court of law to verify the truthfulness of its consumer reports but
rather only investigate in the normal sense of the word.186
The lower court in Brill cited as support for its decision two circuitlevel opinions that gave rise to the factual-or-legal-question test: the First
Circuit’s in DeAndrade v. Trans Union LLC and the Ninth Circuit’s in
Carvalho v. Equifax Information Services.187 Neither of those cases related
to identity theft but instead involved questions of contractual
interpretation.188 Thus, even if courts decide to apply the factual-or-legal181. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 22, at 9 (citing FTC, Report to Congress Under Section
319 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, (Dec. 2012)),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/section-319-fair-and-accurate-credittransactions-act-2003-fifth-interim-federal-trade-commission/130211factareport.pdf.).
182. See Brill v. TransUnion LLC, 838 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2016) (declining to discuss the
lower court’s rationale for dismissing the consumer’s complaint—that the consumer’s identity was
a legal question thus excusing the CRA from its obligation to investigate).
183. See Part III (Section B) (describing the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Brill v. Trans Union).
184. Brill v. Trans Union LLC, No. 15-CV-300-SLC, 2015 WL 9095103, at *5 (W.D. Wis.
Dec. 16, 2015).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i; See infra notes 195–196 and accompanying text (quoting the statute).
186. Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines “investigate” as “to observe or study by close
examination and systematic inquiry.” Investigate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/investigate (last visited on Sept. 20, 2020). As explained, CRA
reinvestigations tend only to verify disputed accounts with the furnisher (e.g. is this the person
who made the transaction?)—a useless inquiry given the furnisher’s records in the case of identity
theft would include only the stolen consumer information. See Kittell, supra note 59, at 48.
187. Brill,2015 WL 9095103 at *3 (citing Carvalho v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, 629
F.3d 876, 890-91 (9th Cir. 2010) and DeAndrade v. Trans Union LLC, 523 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir.
2008).
188. Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 891 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Because CRAs are ill equipped to adjudicate
contract disputes, courts have been loath to allow consumers to mount collateral attacks on the
legal validity of their debts in the guise of FCRA reinvestigation claims . . . For example, in
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question test to identity theft cases, the caselaw that gave rise to the rule can
easily be distinguished. 189 As the District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia wrote in Bailey v. SCANA Energy Marketing, “[a] dispute that a
reported account is the result of identity fraud is the sort of factual dispute
that a CRA is expected to investigate.”190
Like the Seventh Circuit in Brill v. Trans Union, courts requiring
consumers to prevail in legal actions against furnishing creditors wrongly
shift investigatory costs from the CRA to the consumer. However, the cost
shift here also means prevailing in lawsuits against all the furnishing
creditors behind the identity theft tradelines. That requirement offends
financial justice for a couple reasons. First, identity theft victims are
unnecessarily harmed by the consumer reports while they litigate the debts’
validity.191 Second, many consumers lack the access to justice needed to
litigate the fraudulent accounts. 192 To be clear, even if a CRA rightly
removes identity theft tradelines from identity theft victims’ consumer
reports, the risk from unequal access to justice remains a big problem for
consumer reports. A well-lawyered furnishing creditor could indeed prevail
in a debt collection action against an identity theft victim, 193 thus allowing
the CRA to resume reporting of the identity theft tradeline. However, there
is no need for courts and CRAs to push identity theft victims out of
financial society before such a judgment.

DeAndrade, the dispute centered on whether the consumer had ratified an allegedly fraudulent
mortgage.”)
189. Cf. DeAndrade, 523 F.3d at 68 (1st Cir. 2008); Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 893 (9th Cir. 2010).
190. Bailey v. SCANA Energy Mktg., Inc., No. 1:18-CV-1725-AT-JKL, 2018 WL 7575542, at
*10 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2018) (holding a consumer plaintiff’s unreasonable reinvestigation claim a
factual rather than legal question, and thus not a collateral attack on the legal validity of a debt,
and therefore sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss) (citing DeAndrade, 523 F.3d at 68 (1st
Cir. 2008)).
191. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text (explaining how inaccurate consumer
reports can result in loss of access to credit, housing, and employment).
192. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, HOW DEBT COLLECTORS ARE TRANSFORMING THE
BUSINESS OF STATE COURTS (May 2020), at 13, https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2020/06/debt-collectors-to-consumers.pdf. (explaining that consumers typically
have legal representation in less than 10 percent of debt claims). See also APPLESEED, DUE
PROCESS AND CONSUMER DEBT: ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO JUSTICE IN CONSUMER CREDIT
CASES (2009), at 1-2. (explaining that more than 40 percent of consumer credit cases resulted in
default judgments and that some of the judgments were entered against consumers who do not
actually owe the debt).
193. See APPLESEED, DUE PROCESS AND CONSUMER DEBT: ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO
JUSTICE IN CONSUMER CREDIT CASES (2009), at 1-2 (“Since all creditors [in typical consumer
debt cases] are represented by counsel and the defenses available to debtors can be complex, the
gross disparity in representation means that debtors often never raise the overwhelming majority
of legitimate defenses available to them. Creditors are able to obtain judgments against debtor
defendants without ever needing to submit proof of the debt or the amount owed.”).
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SOLUTION

The most obvious solution is for all courts to simply apply the law as it
is written: A CRA must investigate consumer disputes related to identity
theft reasonably, and that means doing more than simply verifying the
disputed tradeline with a conflicted furnisher and punting the costs of an
actual investigation to the consumer.194
The FCRA provides that a CRA must conduct a “reasonable
reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate
and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item
from the file in accordance with paragraph (5), before the end of [a] 30-day
period beginning on the date on which the agency receives the notice of the
dispute from the consumer or reseller.”195 Paragraph (5) describes how a
CRA must treat inaccurate or unverifiable information.
If, after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1) of any information
disputed by a consumer, an item of the information is found to be
inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified, the consumer reporting
agency shall— (i) promptly delete that item of information from the file of
the consumer, or modify that item of information, as appropriate, based on
the results of the reinvestigation; and (ii) promptly notify the furnisher of
that information that the information has been modified or deleted from
the file of the consumer.196

If the CRA cannot verify the disputed information through a reasonable
reinvestigation then it must delete it or modify it based on what the CRA
has learned from a reasonable reinvestigation.197 Doing nothing more than
verifying the disputed information with its original and conflicted source—
the furnisher—should be prima facie unreasonable, with the burden then
moving to the CRA to show that its costs to actually verify the accuracy of
the information outweigh the harm the disputed accounts cause the
consumer. Courts have however been hesitant to adopt that simple answer.
While the Third Circuit held in Cushman that reasonability of a CRA’s
reinvestigation is a question of fact for the jury to solve based on a
balancing of the burden of a CRA’s reinvestigation against the harm that
the disputed accounts cause the consumer,198 the Seventh Circuit in Brill
shifts investigatory costs to the consumer based on an approach that focuses
almost exclusively on CRA costs with little inquiry into consumer harm.199
194. See supra note 185 (explaining that the CRA’s do not “investigate” consumer disputes in
the normal sense of the word).
195. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(A).
197. 15 U.S.C. §1681i(a)..
198. Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 1997).
199. Compare Brill v. TransUnion LLC, 838 F.3d 919, 920–22 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding a
CRA’s reinvestigation reasonable as a matter of law where the CRA declined to delete or modify
the disputed item following an investigation that did no more than verify disputed information
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In other words, the Seventh Circuit says the identity theft victim bears the
burden of proving his innocence to avoid the harm of an inaccurate
consumer report. Muddling the law even further is the potential for courts to
remove the First and Ninth Circuits factual-or-legal-question test from its
contract-dispute facts, instead using it to dismiss identity theft victims
claims at the pleading stage.200 Indeed, the plain text solution has yet to win
the day, perhaps reflecting a hesitancy by courts to open their doors to a
wave of consumer lawsuits alleging CRAs failed to reasonably reinvestigate
identity theft transactions. What matters is the law and its purpose. Here,
that is to hold CRAs responsible for accurate consumer reporting, and to
allow people harmed by inaccurate reports to have them corrected. 201
Therefore, the best path forward is a new standard that harmonizes the
Third and Seventh Circuit’s approaches with the FCRA’s remedial scheme
and FACTA’s identity theft provisions.
A

ARMONI IN T E CIRCUIT SPLIT IN LI
AMENDED Y FACTA

T OF T E FCRA AS

The rationales underlying holdings against identity theft victims
alleging unreasonable reinvestigations appear based on a desire to put part
of the burden of accurate credit reporting on consumers themselves. Putting
investigatory burden on consumers means lessening the burden on CRAs. A
CRA’s investigatory burden is a key component of the Third Circuit’s
Cushman standard: a CRA on notice that its furnisher is not a reliable
source of information must bear the burden of investigation above and
beyond the furnisher verification if the burden of a reasonable investigation
is lower than the harm caused by the consumer report. 202 Therefore, a
consumer could conduct some good faith investigatory acts which might
alleviate the concerns underlying the Seventh Circuit’s standard, 203 and
those acts could be read as lowering the CRA’s investigatory burden thus
harmonizing a solution into the Third Circuit’s approach from Cushman.
T E PROPOSED TEST
To prevail on an unreasonable reinvestigation claim against a CRA
where the consumer disputes tradelines as inaccurate due to identity theft,

with its furnisher in response to a consumer asserting identity theft, because a consumer failed to
submit evidence proving their identity was stolen) with 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (stating that a CRA
must conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of the disputed information and delete or modify the
disputed information in accordance with the reinvestigation if the disputed information cannot be
verified)..
200. See Part III (Section C) (describing the factual-or-legal question test and how it is
inappropriate in the identity theft context).
201. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), 1681i.
202. Part III (Section A) (describing the Third Circuit’s holding in Cushman v. Trans Union).
203. See Part III (Section B) (describing the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Brill v. Trans Union).
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the consumer could be required to show good faith. The good faith showing
could include factors related to (1) mitigation of damages and (2) helping
the CRA correct the reports, for example. A consumer meeting just one
factor could be plenty sufficient for a good faith finding. In light of the
FCRA’s purpose to encourage fair and equitable credit reporting, this good
faith showing by the consumer would have to be an exceptionally low
pleading hurdle. Such a showing is not required by the statute for a
consumer to prevail in an unreasonable reinvestigation claim against a
CRA, but it would serve to harmonize the caselaw.
Some factors to consider for showing an effort by the consumer to
mitigate damages could include:
Placing a fraud alert on their credit file in accordance with FACTA.
Placing a credit freeze on their credit file in accordance with
FACTA.
Some factors to consider for showing an effort by the consumer to help
the CRA correct the identity theft tradelines on the consumer report could
include:
Sending some information in the dispute letter corroborating that an
identity thief and not the consumer opened the accounts (e.g.
statement from a witness providing an alibi, the consumer’s
signature to compare to forged signatures, a copy of a police report
the consumer filed with local law enforcement as to the identity
theft, potential suspects that the CRA might look into by comparing
spending patterns of the suspect with the disputed tradelines).
Using discovery to inquire into the furnisher’s reliability in those
instances that a furnisher has brought a debt collection action
against the consumer, and the consumer has been able to afford
such litigation.
Unreturned phone calls and messages left with the CRA and/or
furnisher.
Filing of an Identity Theft Report with the FTC.
Filing of consumer complaints with the CFPB.
Timely response to any CRA questions or inquiries following-up on
the consumer’s dispute.
CONCLUSION
The full harm from data breaches compromising consumers’ personal
information is not yet known, but identity theft surely follows.204 As CRAs
profit from consumers’ information without consent, and fail to protect it
from hackers, it is only right that they actually investigate the accuracy of
their reports. Without diligent investigation, the CRA wrongly pushes
consumers out of financial society for an imposter’s crime. That can mean
204. See Wu, et. al, supra note 22, at 12.
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the loss of a job, access to credit, and even a place to live. Whether right or
wrong, Congress endorsed consumer reports as a metric for lending and
other types of consumer screening when it passed the FCRA. In doing so, it
required CRAs to maintain procedures meant to ensure “maximum possible
accuracy”205 and created liability for CRAs where they report information
that they cannot verify with a reasonable reinvestigation. 206 The dual
purposes of the law can only be served if courts allow consumers the fair
and equitable remedies promised in the 1996 Amendments.207 The statutory
language is sufficiently clear to allow that, and the Henson court’s rationale,
applied to identity theft in Cushman, provides a clear solution. To follow
the Seventh Circuit’s standard in Brill would not only turn a blind eye to the
FCRA’s text and purposes but would effectively deny consumers their only
remedy for being cast out of financial society. Of course, the concerns
apparent in the Seventh Circuit’s test could be alleviated by a good faith
requirement for consumers, which could naturally be read into the Cushman
burden-harm balancing approach with due recognition of FACTA’s identity
theft provisions.
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205. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a).
207. Part II (Section A) (describing how the remedial scheme was incorporated into 15 U.S.C. §
1681i).
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